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Note
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE NOTICE-PREJUDICE RULE TO PURE
CLAIMS-MADE INSURANCE POLICIES
JEFFREY P. GRIFFIN
The claims-made insurance policy has become the dominant form of
liability insurance, overtaking the once-popular occurrence policy. Due in
part to an easily identifiable coverage trigger and affordable premiums,
the benefits of a claims-made insurance policy are enjoyed by both the
insured and the insurer. A unique type of claims-made policy—the pure
claims-made policy—developed to protect an insured against claims made
during the policy period or soon thereafter, ensuring that coverage is
provided if a claim is made during the final hours of an insured’s policy
period even if it is reported after the expiration of the policy.
As claims-made insurance policies became more prevalent, so did
litigation involving coverage disputes. The typical case involved an
insurer’s denial of coverage following an insured’s unreasonably late
notice of a claim. In deciding some of these late notice cases, courts
applied the notice-prejudice rule—a rule traditionally used in the
occurrence policy context—to pure claims-made policies. When applied,
the rule prohibits an insurer from denying coverage due to unreasonably
late notice unless it can show it was prejudiced by the delay. This Note
argues that application of such a rule undermines the pure claims-made
insurance form, as such policies are priced based on an insurer’s
knowledge that claims will be made and reported within the policy period
or soon thereafter. If unable to rely on this basic assumption, the insurer
will be unable to sell such policies, and insureds will no longer benefit
from this insured-friendly insurance format.
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THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE NOTICE-PREJUDICE RULE TO PURE
CLAIMS-MADE INSURANCE POLICIES
JEFFREY P. GRIFFIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that on February 1, 2007, a California company purchased an
errors and omissions insurance policy from a national insurance carrier, set
to expire on February 1, 2008. This hypothetical policy provides that any
claims made against this California company must be reported to the
insurer “as soon as practicable.” Unfortunately for the company, an error
or omission led to a claim made against it on October 15, 2007. The
company knew that in California, an insurer requiring notice of a claim “as
soon as practicable” cannot deny coverage for late reporting of claims—no
matter how late—unless it can show it was prejudiced by the delay. In fear
that its premiums may go up if it reported the claim, the company decided
to wait to report anything to the carrier in case the litigation proved
frivolous.
Meanwhile, the insurer’s actuaries are at the home office, attempting to
set rates for other insureds. In doing so, the actuaries and underwriters rely
on the fact that in most states, it will not have to provide coverage for
claims reported outside the policy period and not “as soon as practicable.”
The insurer knows that when it is able to confidently close its books on a
policy soon after the end of the policy period, it may calculate increasingly
accurate rates for policyholders while maintaining its own profit. In March
of 2009, the hypothetical California company discovered that its error was
worse than it thought, only then finding itself ready to turn to its insurer for
coverage. Because California courts decided that an insurer is not harmed
by delay of notice even if its actuarial basis for calculating risks is
undermined, the carrier will be required to provide coverage even though
the insured failed to comply with the requirements of its policy.1 This
Note will examine various jurisdictions’ reactions to similar fact patterns,
and will argue that the law should not force an insurer to provide coverage
*
University of Connecticut, B.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate
2010. I would like to thank Professor Jill Anderson for her invaluable comments and guidance
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review
for all their hard work during the editing process. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their
unending support and encouragement throughout my life. All errors contained herein are mine and
mine alone.
1
See Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 955–57 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that an insurer requiring notice of a claim “as soon as practicable” must show it was
prejudiced by late notice of a claim in order to deny coverage).
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when notice is outside the policy period and not “as soon as practicable.”
Professional liability insurance comes in two general forms:
occurrence and claims-made.2 Claims-made coverage is relatively new to
insurance markets; it was developed in part to limit insurer’s exposure to
claims that are reported significantly after the end of a policy period. An
insurance format that limits such late reports allows for less expensive
insurance policies, a benefit that is passed on to policyholders in the form
of lower premiums.3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, as claims-made insurance
policies became more prevalent, so did litigation involving such policies.
One of the most frequently litigated issues in the claims-made context
involves the problem of an insured’s late reporting of a claim, and courts
are often asked whether an insurer can properly deny coverage based on
failure to provide timely notice as required by the policy.4 Possibly due to
the complexity of such policies, some courts began applying the older,
common law notice-prejudice rule to some types of claims-made policies
without considering the propriety of the rule in such a context.5 The rule
effectively allows an insured to provide its insurer with late notice of a
claim and still obtain coverage, so long as the late notice does not
“prejudice” the insurer.6 Unfortunately, the application of such a rule
undermines the basic underpinnings of claims-made coverage,7 potentially
eliminating the benefits such policies provide to both the insured and
insurer.
This Note focuses on a particular type of claims-made policy—the
pure claims-made policy—and argues that the notice-prejudice rule should
not be applied to such policies. Part II of this Note discusses common
types of liability insurance forms, and explores various types of claimsmade policies. This section also introduces claims-made notice provisions,
the element of the policy that is at the heart of a discussion involving late
notice and the notice-prejudice rule. Part III explores current case law
involving claims-made insurance policies and late notice of claims. The
first section discusses the inapplicability of the notice-prejudice rule to
2
See Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid
Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 518 (1999)
(noting that “liability insurance comes in two flavors: occurrence and claims-made”).
3
Id. at 516–17.
4
See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 504
(2008) (noting that “[t]he notice provision is one of the most litigated conditions in liability insurance
policies of all kinds”).
5
See Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs, 307 F.3d at 956–57 (holding that the noticeprejudice rule applies to pure claims-made policies but not claims-made and reported policies).
6
See, e.g., Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 1977) (holding “that where an
insurance company seeks to be relieved of its obligations under a liability insurance policy on the
grounds of late notice, the insurance company will be required to prove that the notice provision was in
fact breached and that the breach resulted in prejudice to its position”).
7
Specifically, by requiring notice to be within the policy period or within a reasonable time
thereafter, an insurer can easily identify its risk and thereby accurately price its policies.
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claims-made and reported policies. The second section explores case law
involving the applicability of the notice-prejudice rule to pure claims-made
policies. Recently, a court applying California law has held that the noticeprejudice rule is not applicable to some types of claims-made policies, but
is applicable to pure claims-made policies.9 On the other hand, courts in
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts have held that the rule is not
applicable to pure claims-made policies.10 Finally, this Note argues that
courts deciding similar issues in the future should look to Texas,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts when making their conclusions, thereby
preserving the benefits offered by pure claims-made insurance policies.
II. COMMON LIABILITY INSURANCE FORMS: OCCURRENCE POLICIES
AND CLAIMS-MADE POLICIES
A. Occurrence Policies
Before one scrutinizes claims-made insurance policies in light of the
notice-prejudice rule, it is important to understand the nature of the claimsmade insurance policy itself, specifically focusing on the elements of
claims-made policies and the triggers that provide coverage. Interestingly,
an initial examination of occurrence policies—the alternative form of
liability insurance11 and the predecessor to claims-made coverage12—aids
in this analysis by offering a view into the rationale for the development of
claims-made policies.13 The Florida Supreme Court defined an occurrence
policy as one “in which the coverage is effective if the negligent act or
omission occurs within the policy period, regardless of the date of
discovery or the date the claim is made or asserted.”14 Automobile policies

8

The term “claims-made and reported” is the specific name of the type of claims-made policy
that dominates late notice case law in the liability insurance context. As will be discussed, the tendency
of courts to simply call these policies “claims-made policies” has led to confusion among
commentators and courts alike, as the particular reporting requirement goes unknown to the reader of
the case.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 150–60 (discussing the application of the notice-prejudice
rule to pure claims-made policies in California).
10
See infra notes 161–225 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of the notice-prejudice
rule to pure claims-made policies in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Texas).
11
See Works, supra note 2, at 518 (noting that liability insurance “comes in two flavors:
occurrence and claims-made”).
12
See id. at 515 n.12 (noting that claims-made policies made occurrence policies obsolete). It has
been suggested that the occurrence policy has its origins in insuring against shipping losses at sea. See,
e.g., Zuckerman v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 398 (N.J. 1985) (providing that occurrence
policies originated when insurance was primarily used to insure against property loss at sea).
13
See John K. Parker, The Untimely Demise of the “Claims Made” Insurance Form? A Critique
of Stine v. Continental Cas. Co., 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 25, 27 (1983) (“Definitions of ‘occurrence’
policies universally accompany ‘claims made’ definitions because they are best understood when
contrasted one to the other. In a sense, these two forms of insurance are opposites.”).
14
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 1983).
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are common examples of occurrence policies that are still available;15 the
automobile policy is triggered the moment an accident occurs, and the
insurer will be required to pay claims whenever they might be made—be it
within the policy period or years later.
In the context of professional liability insurance policies, occurrence
policies have not been a viable option ever since the introduction of
claims-made policies to the insurance market.16 Unlike with automobile
policies, a negligent act in an occurrence professional liability policy might
not cause an injury until years after the policy has expired.17 While it is
likely that the entire claim in an automobile policy will be resolved within
the policy period given the nature of automobile claims, an occurrence
policy in the professional liability context is more susceptible to claims
materializing years after the expiration of the particular occurrence policy
that was in effect when the injurious act occurred.18 In Zuckerman v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court
highlighted the difference between an automobile occurrence policy and a
professional liability occurrence policy:
In the context of professional malpractice or long-term
exposure to hazardous environmental conditions, however,
the injury and the negligence that cause it are often not
discoverable until years after the delictual act or omission.
Consequently, with these types of perils, claims will
frequently be made years after the insured event, and long tail
exposure becomes a significant problem.19
In fact, in 1988, an insurer was required to tender a defense of claims that
arose from activities occurring between 1924 and 1969.20
15

See Works, supra note 2, at 514 (noting that automobile policies are occurrence policies).
See id. at 515 n.12 (noting that “[b]efore the advent of claims-made policies made them
obsolete, ‘occurrence’ professional liability policies often were triggered when the professional
services were rendered—and the negligent act or omission allegedly occurred—rather than when the
client was injured”).
17
See id. at 514 (noting that “everything we would consider an element of [a car] accident, from
[the damage] to the insurer’s payments to the [victims], seems likely to be conveniently packed within
a single policy period”); Parker, supra note 13, at 30 (“Modernly there are events whose ‘occurrence’ is
still easily and readily ascertained and, therefore, still universally insured on an ‘occurrence’ basis.
Automobile coverage is an example of this.”). Parker also noted that such occurrence policies are not
as suited to the professional liability context: “Of course, in the professional or product liability areas,
negligent errors, omissions or product defects can remain latent and undiscovered for literally scores of
years before becoming actionable. The ‘occurrence’ of the event insured is often unclear in these
contexts.” Id. at 31.
18
See Zuckerman v. Nat. Union Fire Ins., 495 A.2d 395, 399 (N.J. 1985) (“The long tail exposure
inherent in ‘occurrence’ policies is less likely to be a problem in the context of certain more familiar
perils, such as automobile accidents, where the insured event is easy to identify in terms of time and
place, the resulting injury is immediately perceived, and a claim is typically asserted soon after the
occurrence.”).
19
Id.
20
Works, supra note 2, at 516 n.17.
16
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Commentators have been quick to highlight the problems with an
insurer that finds itself required to defend claims arising out of activities
that occurred over sixty years earlier. For one, the complicated nature of
occurrence policies makes them difficult to price, and underwriting such
policies becomes an increased gamble for an insurer. Because the insurer
must wait years before it can accurately calculate its loss data, it would be
increasingly difficult to accurately price newly underwritten occurrence
policies.21 Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that “[t]his
time lapse prevents insurers from making a precise calculation of
premiums based upon the cost of the risks assumed. Not uncommonly,
‘occurrence’ policy premiums have proven to be grossly inadequate to
cover the inflationary increase in the cost of settling claims asserted years
later.”22
The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that occurrence policies pose
more problems than merely the difficulty in accurately calculating a
particular risk. Specifically, the court provided that “new theories of
recovery in tort law and increased consumer awareness have contributed to
an increase in the number of claims that undermines the actuarial basis for
premiums on occurrence policies issued years earlier.”23 Moreover,
occurrence policies are ill suited for insuring against risks in which a
potentially injurious act will be difficult to recognize. Unlike an accident
in an automobile policy, an injurious event in a professional liability
occurrence policy may be hard to identify, contributing to disputes and
further pricing difficulties.24 Likewise, there may be times when a claim is
made so long after the expiration of an occurrence policy that the
underwriter or insurance company originally providing the policy is no
longer in existence.25 Finally, occurrence policies issued many years
21

See id. at 516 (“Consequently, the longer the period for which one must ‘develop’ immature
historical loss data in order to estimate ultimate loss costs for policies written in the past, and the longer
into the future one must peer in an effort to trend those estimates of past loss costs in order to make
predictions about future loss costs for new policies, the greater the likelihood for error.”).
22
Zuckerman, 495 A.2d at 399.
23
Id.
24
Id. (“An additional shortcoming associated with the use of ‘occurrence’ policies for perils that
can cause latent injuries over an extended period of time is the difficulty in determining precisely when
the essential causal event occurred. This is particularly true in products liability, professional
malpractice, and environmental litigation.”). John Parker made a similar observation:
Increased social and industrial complexity . . . as well as expanded tort notions, have
made pinpointing the occurrence of many fortuitous events very difficult. For
example, in the relatively new area of asbestos and other environmental exposure
litigation, courts, legislatures, and even scholars are confused about, or disagree as
to when the insured event ‘occurs.’ The difficulty arises because of the latent and
continuing nature of the ‘injury’ and the long term exposure precipitating it.
Parker, supra note 13, at 30–31.
25
See Zuckerman, 495 A.2d at 399 (“A further disadvantage of ‘occurrence’ policies is that their
long tail exposure can lead to situations in which the policy underwriter is no longer in existence at the
time a claim is finally made.”). Another related problem arises when allegedly injurious acts might
have occurred over a period of years, and the insured switches from one occurrence insurance carrier to
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before an injury becomes apparent may be wholly inadequate to cover a
claim. That is, it is likely that the policy limits of the original occurrence
policy are far smaller than what would be necessary to provide adequate
coverage in present day terms.26 In addition to the insured’s frustration
with the potential for inadequate coverage, the insurer may also find that
the premium it collected years earlier related to a risk that, at the time,
would result in far less exposure than that same risk in current terms.27
B. Development of Claims-Made Policies
Due in large part to the problematic nature of occurrence policies, the
insurance industry sought an alternative form of insurance to provide
adequate protection to insureds while avoiding the issues inherent in
occurrence policies.
Without the development of an alternative,
commentators predicted that some types of professional liability insurance
markets would completely dissolve. For instance, John Parker suggested
that:
[D]ue to the actuarial difficulty of dealing with [occurrence
policy problems], the “occurrence” form necessarily makes
insurers dependent on their financial reserves in underwriting
that type of insurance. Correspondingly, the “occurrence”
form has greatly contributed to the volatility of premiums and
the unavailability of any insurance whatsoever in some
professions. This, of course, is detrimental to the insured’s
interests because it threatens his very status as an insured,
and again, the public ultimately bears the adverse
consequences. The ‘claims made’ form, at least for the
present and near future, precludes this highly undesirable
result.28

the other. Not only is the particular “occurrence” that led to the injury difficult to identify, but
litigation is likely to ensue between insurers in order to determine who is liable for the claims. See
Thoracic Cardio. Assocs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1994)
(“Another difficulty with occurrence policies is that when professional negligence continues over a
period of time, and an insured changes from one occurrence carrier to another, uncertainty exists about
which insurer will provide coverage.”).
26
See Parker, supra note 13, at 75 (“Along the same lines, it has been mentioned that even the
professional or business that had ‘occurrence’ insurance is not properly protected from the ‘long tail’
problem because of the gross inadequacy of formerly acceptable coverage limits.”).
27
See, e.g., Thoracic Cardio. Assocs., 891 P.2d at 919 (“One problem with occurrence policies is
that the insurer cannot calculate the premium for the risk with any certainty. The insurer must compute
premiums for occurrence professional liability policies at current rates while claims must be resolved at
market rates, sometimes long after the premiums have been paid.”).
28
Parker, supra note 13, at 77. Because of the “highly undesirable results” resulting from
occurrence policies, Parker notes that the claims-made policy “is a natural and essential response to the
legitimate needs of both the insurance consumer and supplier, without which the insurance market
would be a crippled anachronism.” Id. at 32, 77.
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The advent of claims-made policies was therefore a necessary response to
the increasing problems with occurrence insurance policies. As Professor
Works suggests:
[It would be better] if a claim made against an insured in
1985 based upon a latent injury that ‘occurred’ in 1945 could
have been treated as triggering the 1985 policy rather than the
1945 policy; with the benefit of forty additional years of
experience to reflect the correlated changes in inflation, loss
frequency, legal doctrine, medical technology and jury
attitudes over that period, the best pricing guesses for 1985
must necessarily be superior to the best pricing guesses for
1945.29
In this way, Professor Works notes that in place of occurrence policy
triggers, an insurer would rather “employ a policy trigger that falls later in
the sequence rather than earlier, in order to shorten the time between when
a policy obligation is priced and when the extent of that obligation is
determined.”30
Insurers did in fact respond by creating an insurance policy with a new
trigger; claims-made policies would be triggered not by the insured’s
injurious act, but rather by when a claim is made on the policy.31 The
types of claims-made triggers vary (and will be explored in detail in the
forthcoming discussion of the notice-prejudice rule), but the general
identifying element of a claims-made policy is that the risk being insured
against is the claim on the policy, rather than the occurrence of a peril as
insured against in occurrence policies. The Zuckerman court succinctly
noted the difference between occurrence and claims-made policies:
In the ‘occurrence’ policy, the peril insured is the
‘occurrence’ itself.
Once the occurrence takes place,
coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for
some time thereafter. While in the ‘claims made’ policy, it is
the making of the claim which is the event and the peril being
insured and, subject to policy language, regardless of when
the occurrence took place.32
By moving the trigger to the claim rather than the occurrence, it would
seem that the insurers found a policy that would reduce some of the issues
29

Works, supra note 2, at 516–17.
Id. at 516.
31
See id. at 517 (“If the policy trigger no longer must be the injury, but instead could be the
claim, many of the nasty . . . problems involved in determining when an occurrence occurred disappear,
and the guesswork involved in determining a price for future liability coverage can be made less
daunting.”).
32
Zuckerman v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 398 (N.J. 1985) (internal citation
omitted).
30
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associated with the problematic occurrence policies.
Courts and commentators agree that the adoption of claims-made
policies remedied many of the problems associated with occurrence
policies. Importantly, an insurer could now significantly reduce the long
tail exposure once associated with occurrence policies since claims-made
policies will allow an insurer to be aware of its exposure soon after the end
of a policy period.33 Since claims-made policies are triggered by a claim
rather than an act that leads to an injury, the insurer will know that it will
not have to cover claims after the expiration of the policy.34 This
knowledge will benefit the parties to the insurance contract, as the insurer
will be able to calculate the premium on future policies with increased
precision and confidence.35
Because claims-made policies insure risks over a shorter period, an
insurer can also more precisely calculate both premiums and the reserves it
must keep since it will no longer be concerned with inflationary changes
that plagued insurers offering occurrence policies.36 Likewise, the
shortened tail exposure will allow an insurer to price its policies based on
current law and jury award trends, and it need not worry about the effect of
evolving legal doctrine in future years.37 The insurer’s ability to precisely
calculate premiums also benefits the insured; the shortened tail of exposure
leads not only to an increasingly accurate calculation of insurance
premiums, but it also leads to far lower premium costs when compared to
33
See Thoracic Cardio. Assocs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 916, 920 (Ariz. App.
Ct. 1994) (noting that insurers switched to employing claims-made policies so as to “reduce exposure
to an unpredictable and lengthy ‘tail’ of lawsuits filed years after the occurrence they agreed to protect
against”).
34
See id. (noting that claims-made policies allow an insurer to be confident that claims will not
arise under the policy following its expiration). This is a simplified view, however. The pure claimsmade policy requires the insured to report a claim “as soon as practicable,” which may very well be
soon after the end of the policy period in the event of an eleventh hour claim. Nevertheless, the
distinction is small—a pure claims-made insurer will still benefit from the claims-made policy in that it
will know of its exposure soon after the end of the policy. See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying
text (discussing the benefits of pure claims-made policies).
35
See Zuckerman, 495 A.2d at 400 (“The obvious advantage to the underwriter issuing ‘claims
made’ policies is the ability to calculate risks and premiums with greater exactitude since the insurer’s
exposure ends at a fixed point, usually the policy termination date.”); Thoracic Cardio. Assocs., 891
P.2d at 920 (“An insurer who knows that claims will not arise under the policy after its expiration can
underwrite a risk and calculate premiums with greater certainty.”); see also Parker, supra note 13, at 77
(noting that claims-made insurance policies prevent the insurer from being subject to long tail exposure
associated with occurrence policies).
36
See Thoracic Cardio. Assocs., 891 P.2d at 920 (noting that claims-made policies alleviate
concerns of inflation after the end of the policy period since an insurer will know when its exposure
ends). This benefit also reaches the insured. In Zuckerman, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that
“[a] corollary benefit to the insured is that since liability coverage is purchased on a contemporary
basis, it can afford protection in current dollars for liability that may be based on negligence that
occurred years earlier.” Zuckerman, 495 A.2d at 400.
37
See Thoracic Cardio. Assocs., 891 P.2d at 920 (“The insurer can establish its reserves without
having to consider the possibilities of inflation beyond the policy period, upward spiraling jury awards,
or later changes in the definition and application of negligence.”).
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occurrence policies.
Similarly, by utilizing an insurance policy that
insures against claims rather than occurrences, the insured will benefit
from knowing that the policy limits will not be too little to cover claims.39
An insurer also benefits from a decrease in costs associated with
coverage analyses, since the event that triggers a claims-made policy is far
easier to ascertain than many events that trigger an occurrence policy. One
commentator suggests that this simpler trigger is just as beneficial to the
insurer as it is to the insured:
Additionally, with the “claims made” policy, there is no need
to ascertain when an ‘occurrence’ ‘occurred,’ especially
problematic in long term exposure cases. More than once an
insured has been left without coverage due to a court’s
adverse understanding of “occurrence.” Although there have
been a few cases litigating the issue of when a “claim is
made,” usually its happening is indisputable.40
This analysis makes sense. When an individual is diagnosed with a disease
(asbestosis, for instance) and that individual subsequently files suit against
the asbestos manufacturer, it is easy to determine when the suit was filed.
With that easily-ascertainable information, the insurer will know that the
claims-made policy has been triggered. However, it is more difficult to
determine when the initial injury took place that led to the asbestosis
diagnosis years later. Due in part to the cost of settlement and the
increasing size of jury awards, the various occurrence carriers that insured
the asbestos manufacturer will likely pursue litigation to attempt to point to
each other’s particular policy as the one in effect on the particular date of
“injury.”41 With the claims-made policy and its easily identifiable triggers,
the costs of such litigation need not be built into the price of the premium.
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that claims-made
policies are not only cheaper, but provide greater coverage than their
occurrence counterparts. For instance, John Parker suggests that “[t]he
38
See Parker, supra note 13, at 73 (“[I]t has been clearly established that ‘claims made’ insurance,
at least initially, is vastly cheaper than the ‘occurrence’ variety. Of course this results form the relative
ease of actuarially assessing risks and premiums. Consequently, because the underwriter can more
accurately asses the risk, the insurer pays a lower premium.”).
39
In the occurrence policy context, the insured may slowly become uncomfortable with its policy
limits on old occurrence policies, as inflation and larger jury awards will likely bring some claims far
outside of the policy limits. Of course, claims-made policy limits may be met fairly easily; large jury
awards in the medical malpractice context routinely exhaust policy limits.
40
Parker, supra note 13, at 75.
41
See Works, supra note 2, at 515–16 (using the asbestos example to demonstrate the difficulty of
determining when an injury took place); see also Parker, supra note 13, at 30–31 (utilizing the asbestos
example as illustrative of the difficulty in determining when the event causing the latent injury took
place). It should be noted that in the unlikely event this hypothetical asbestos manufacturer had only
one occurrence carrier throughout its early years of business, the policy period in which the latent
injury occurred would be irrelevant; coverage would attach regardless, and there would be no other
carrier to implicate as insuring during the injurious policy period.
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‘claims made’ form also arguably provides broader coverage [than
occurrence policies]. When it is not subject to specific limitation, it is
completely retrospective, covering all errors or omissions or other
insurable events irrespective of when each occurred.”42 The retrospective
nature of claims-made policies allows an insured who failed to (or was
otherwise unable to) procure insurance during the early years of a business
to purchase claims-made coverage and enjoy protection for negligent acts
that may have occurred in the past that might not yet have given rise to a
Without the development of claims-made policies, those
claim.43
businesses that did not purchase occurrence coverage would be fully
exposed to liability for those years it went unprotected. Likewise, even if
an insured purchased occurrence policies in the early years of its business,
its current claims-made policy could provide additional coverage for
claims that might arise out of injurious acts that took place when the
occurrence policy was in effect. This may be particularly useful when the
occurrence policy limit proves to be far too small to cover the cost of the
injury in present day terms; now, the claims-made policy could make up
the difference.44
C. Elements of Claims-Made Policies
The forthcoming analysis of the notice-prejudice rule will generally
focus on two versions of claims-made policies: the “pure claims-made”
policy (which is the heart of this Note’s thesis), and the older, more
common “claims-made and reported” policy.45 The claims-made and
reported policy is relatively self-explanatory; it contains a two-part
trigger—the first that a claim is made against the insureds during the policy
42
Parker, supra note 13, at 75. It should be noted that many claims-made policies contain
retroactive (“retro”) dates, which afford coverage only for claims arising out of acts or occurrences
after the retro date. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing retro dates in context).
43
Parker, supra note 13, at 75 (“Insureds who could not afford insurance earlier in their
professional careers or business can obtain protection against long term exposure or “long tail”
liabilities arising from events transpiring when they had no insurance.”).
44
Id. Parker notes that:
Along the same lines, it has been mentioned that even the professional or business
that had “occurrence” insurance is not properly protected form the “long tail”
problem because of the gross inadequacy of formerly acceptable coverage limits.
Under such circumstances an insured having a currently operative “claims made”
policy can utilize such as an “excess” policy, due to its retrospective application, and
assure against personal exposure.
Id. Of course, this assumes that the policy at issue does not contain a retro provision for which
coverage exists only for claims arising out of acts or omissions that occur after the specified retro date.
45
See Works, supra note 2, at 525 (noting that “many ‘claims-made’ forms” are claims-made and
reported policies). The majority of claims-made litigation involves claims-made and reported cases;
only a small number of courts address what appear to be pure claims-made policies, and even fewer
courts clearly address pure claims-made policies. The following section will provide analysis of some
of those cases and the reader will notice the high number of courts contemplating claims-made and
reported policies and the correspondingly lower number of courts examining pure claims-made
policies.
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period; and second, that the insureds report the claim to the insurer within
the policy period.46 The insuring agreements in such policies typically
state that “the insured shall, as a condition precedent to their rights under
this policy, give written notice as soon as practicable to the company of a
claim made against the insured, provided that . . . this notice must be
during this policy period.”47 On the other hand, a pure claims-made policy
provides that claims must be made against the insured within the policy
period and reported to the insurer “as soon as practicable.”48
In theory, there should be little difference between the effect of a
claims-made and reported policy on an insured’s coverage, and the effect
of a pure claims-made policy on the insured’s coverage. In the pure
claims-made context, like in the claims-made and reported context, a claim
must be made against the insured, and the insured should then notify the
insurer. The difference is that in pure claims-made policies, the
notification to the insured does not necessarily have to be within the policy
period (although in most circumstances, it still should be within the policy
period), so long as the reporting is done in a manner that is “as soon as
practicable.” The time in which such a difference may be particularly
relevant is when a claim is made against an insured on the last day of his or
46
See, e.g., id. (noting that a claims-made and reported policy “require[s] that at least two things
happen during a particular policy period in order to trigger the policy: with a ‘claims-made-andreported format, the injured party must assert a claim against the insured during the policy period, and
the insured must report that claim to the insurer during the policy period”). Works also provides an
example of a claims-made and reported policy’s insuring agreement:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums in excess of the deductible amount . . .
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages as a result of
CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY
PERIOD AND REPORTED TO THE COMPANY DURING THE POLICY
PERIOD caused by any act, error or omission for which the insured is legally
responsible, and arising out of the rendering or failure to render professional
services for others in the insured’s capacity as a lawyer or notary public.
Id. at 525 n.31.
47
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
48
This is the policy language in Travelers’ HOA/Condo Directors and Officers liability policy, as
amended by its Non-Profit Change Endorsement. Kevin Davis Policy Specimen, http://www.kdis
online.com/specimen_policies/do_country_specimen_0704.pdf (last visited July 24, 2009). This same
pure claims-made Travelers policy has an insuring agreement that defines a “Claim” in the following
manner:
Claim means:
1) a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief;
2) a civil proceeding commenced by the service of a complaint or similar
pleading;
3) a criminal proceeding commenced by a return of an indictment; or
4) a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding commenced by the filing of
a notice of charges, formal investigative order or similar document,
against an insured for a Wrongful Act, including an appeal therefrom.
Id. Section II.S of the Travelers HOA/Condo Directors and Officers policy defines a “Wrongful Act”
as “any error, misstatement, misleading statement, act, omission, neglect, or breach of duty committed
or attempted, or allegedly committed or attempted, by the Insured Organization or by one or more
Insured Persons, individually or collectively, in their respective capacities as such, including but not
limited to any Wrongful Employment Practices.” Id.
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her policy period, and the insured is unable to report the claim to the
insurer on that same day. Following a strict approach to the claims-made
and reported policy, there would be no coverage. With a pure claims-made
policy, a report on the following day (albeit after the expiration of the
policy period) would still likely be “as soon as practicable,” and the policy
will likely afford coverage.
While this Note only critically examines these two overarching types
of claims-made policies in light of the notice-prejudice rule, a brief account
of the numerous varieties of these claims-made policies will be useful in
providing background for the types of risks generally insured against.
Prior to engaging in the analysis, it is important to note that commentators
and courts often use varying terms to describe the same policy, and some
of these terms do not accurately describe the policy at issue. For instance,
in the early days of claims-made insurance, the policies were often called
“discovery policies” or “reporting policies.”49 Although use of varied and
vague terms in describing a particular type of claims-made policy may
seem innocuous at first blush, it is a major factor in courts’ misapplication
of legal rules in the claims-made context.
Professor Works highlights the numerous types of claims-made
triggers and the resulting breadth of the types of claims-made policies on
the market. In addition to the basic triggers found within pure claimsmade policies and claims-made and reported policies, some claims-made
policies also include a “retro date.” A policy with a retro date is one in
which coverage is afforded only if the underlying act or injurious activity
that led to the claim occurred after the retro date.50 This effectively limits
the insurer’s exposure, as it will not have to be concerned with defending
claims arising from acts occurring years earlier. An insuring agreement for
a claims-made and reported policy with a retro date may provide the
following:
A policy is triggered if:
1) the [allegedly tortious act, error or omission] [injury to
the victim] took place after the applicable retro date; and
2) during the policy period,
49
See, e.g., Works, supra note 2, at 521 (noting that claims-made policies have been characterized
as “discovery policies” ever since a federal district court described the policies as such). Such a
characterization may be problematic when discussing some types of claims-made policies with
reporting requirements that may appear less onerous.
50
See id. at 529 (noting that an insured must “determine not only whether the claim was first
made during the policy period, but also whether the allegedly negligent act or omission that prompted
the claim (or, in some policies, the injury to the victim) occurred after the retro date”). A retro date
typically corresponds with the date the insured switched from an occurrence policy to a claims-made
policy. This provides the insured with coverage for claims arising out of occurrences before the retro
date by way of the insured’s old occurrence policies, and after the retro date through the insured’s new
claims-made policies.
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a) the victim made a claim against the insured; and
b) the insured reported the claim to the insurer.51
Likewise, some claims-made policies allow an insured to notify the insurer
of acts that occurred during the policy period that may eventually give rise
to a claim. Once the insurer is notified of these acts, the insurer will
provide coverage should a claim materialize, even if that claim falls
outside the policy period.52 Most claims-made policies also allow an
insured to purchase “extended reporting periods” that provide an extension
of insurance coverage for claims that arise out of acts occurring within the
policy period but evolve into claims after the period ends.53 This type of
“tail coverage” can come in two forms. The first form only allows an
insured to purchase such coverage if the insurer cancels or non-renews the
policy.54 The second form allows the insured to purchase such coverage
either if the insurer cancels or non-renews, or if the insured decides not to
renew his or her policy.55 As can be seen, there are numerous variations of
claims-made policies and triggers, and consideration of such variations is
important as they are often at issue in late-notice cases.
III. LATE NOTICE AND THE NOTICE-PREJUDICE RULE
As mentioned above, the forthcoming analysis of the notice-prejudice
rule focuses on pure claims-made and claims-made and reported policies.
Again, the traditional claims-made and reported policy contains a two-part
trigger—the first that a claim is made against the insured during the policy
51

Id. at 530 exhibit 7.
See id. at 527 (discussing provisions that provide coverage for claims arising out of acts
occurring within the policy period that mature into a claim outside the policy period). A policy
provision that allows for such coverage may provide:
If, during the policy [or any tail coverage] . . . the insured first becomes aware that
an insured has committed a specific act, error or omission in professional services
for which coverage is otherwise provided hereunder, and if the insured shall during
the [policy period or tail period] . . . give notice to the Company of:
(a) the specific act, error or omission; and
(b) the injury or damage which has or may result from such act, error or
omission; and
(c) the circumstances by which the insured first becomes aware of such act, error
or omission then any claim that may subsequently be made against the
insured arising out of such act or omission shall be deemed for the purpose
of this insurance to have been made within [the coverage period].
Id. at 527–28 n.35.
53
See id. at 528 n.36 (providing that “[s]ome ‘claims-made’ policies contain ‘extended reporting’
or ‘tail’ coverage provisions that guarantee a right to purchase (for an additional premium) a limited
extension of the coverage for future claims arising out of acts or omissions committed prior to the
termination of the coverage”).
54
See id. (noting that these types of extended reporting provisions are often “one way,” which is
only available when the insurer decides to end the insuring relationship; if the insured cancels or nonrenews, the option is unavailable).
55
See id. (noting that this type of provision is less common and can vary depending on the type of
professional liability that is insured against).
52

250

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:235

period—and second, that the insured report the claim to the insurer within
the policy period.56 The insuring agreement in a claims-made and reported
policy may state that “the insured shall, as a condition precedent to their
rights under this policy, give written notice as soon as practicable to the
company of a claim made against the insured, provided that . . . this notice
must be during this policy period.”57 On the other hand, a pure claimsmade policy provides that claims must be made against the insured within
the policy period and reported to the insurer “as soon as practicable.”58
Notice of a claim to the insurer in claims-made policies is often a condition
precedent to coverage,59 and the common law of conditions would suggest
that if the insured fails to provide timely notice, then there will simply be
no coverage.60 However, in many jurisdictions the notice-prejudice rule
may save an insured by providing coverage notwithstanding late notice of
a claim, so long as a court determines that the insurer is otherwise
unaffected (or, more specifically, unprejudiced) by the tardy notice.61
There are a significant number of situations in which an insured fails to
give prompt notice of a claim to the insurer, thereby sparking litigation as
to whether the late notice should be excused and if coverage should
therefore be afforded under the policy. The reasons for late notice vary;
and as Professor Works suggests, there are a “range of snares” that may
cause late notice.62 In his article, Professor Works highlights the following
cases to illustrate the range of such explanations.63 In Zuckerman v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co., the insured thought that the claim
would be within the policy deductible and therefore did not anticipate the
56
See id. at 525 (noting that a claims-made and reported policy “require[s] that at least two things
happen during a particular policy period in order to trigger the policy: with a ‘claims-made-andreported’ format, the injured party must assert a claim against the insured during the policy period, and
the insured must report that claim to the insurer during the policy period”).
57
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
58
This is the policy language in Travelers Indemnity Company’s HOA/Condo Directors and
Officers liability policy, as amended by its Non-Profit Change Endorsement, CIRI 70004 (04-00).
59
See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1983) (noting that
“[b]oth claims-made and occurrence policies generally have provisions written into the contract that
require, as a condition of the policy, that the insured give notice of the claim to tine insurance carrier
‘immediately,’ ‘promptly,’ ‘as soon as practicable,’ or ‘within a reasonable time’”).
60
See Works, supra note 2, at 544–45 (noting that under “the strict common law of conditions,”
late notice of a claim would foreclose insurance coverage). In jurisdictions requiring a showing of
prejudice, there are different rules regarding which party has the burden of proof. In some states, when
an insured breaches the notice provision of a policy, coverage exists until the insurer can prove it was
prejudiced by the breach. See, e.g., Weaver v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 936 S.W.2d 818, 821
(Mo. 1997) (requiring the insurer to prove prejudice before it will be relieved from providing
coverage). However, in other states, late notice creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice that the
insured has the burden to disprove. See, e.g., Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Tenn. 1998)
(holding that when an insured breaches the notice provision of an occurrence policy, a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises that the policyholder must disprove to avoid liability).
61
See Works, supra note 2, at 538–39 (discussing the states that have adopted the noticeprejudice rule).
62
Id. at 544.
63
See id. (providing a list of cases that highlight common excuses by an insured for late notice).
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64

need to report the claim.
In Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund
Insurance Co., the insured reported a claim in a timely manner to the
primary insurer, but failed to provide timely notice to the excess insurer.65
In Thoracic Cardiovascular Associates, Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., suit was filed against the insured during the policy period
(thereby constituting a claim), but the insured was unaware that suit was
filed until service was made on the insured after the policy had expired.66
Finally, in Home Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Adco Oil Co., the insured
thought that a claim was without merit and thought that it could be
resolved without involving the insurer and risking an increase in
premium.67
In jurisdictions that have adopted the notice-prejudice rule, an insurer
must show that it was prejudiced by the insured’s late notice of a claim in
order to disclaim liability under the policy.68 While some states have
created a statutory notice-prejudice rule, the vast majority have
implemented the notice-prejudice rule through the common law.
A. Notice-Prejudice Rule in Claims-Made and Reported Policies
Few courts have considered whether the notice-prejudice rule should
apply to pure claims-made policies (and the aim of this Note is to articulate
why courts should conclude that it does not apply).69 However, there is an
abundance of case law addressing whether the rule should apply to claimsmade and reported policies, and consideration of the major cases
discussing this issue is necessary prior to engaging in a similar analysis
with respect to pure claims-made policies.
1. Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis
In what has become a landmark case in the area of claims-made
insurance litigation, Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis was one
of the first cases in which a state supreme court concluded that the noticeprejudice rule should not apply to claims-made and reported insurance
64
65

1990)).

See id. at 544 (citing Zuckerman v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 396 (N.J. 1985)).
See id. (citing Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Mass.

66
See id. (citing Thoracic Cardio. Assocs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 916, 919
(Ariz. App. Ct. 1994)).
67
See id. (citing Home Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Adco Oil Co., 987 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (N.D. Ill.
1997)).
68
See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 1977) (discussing the noticeprejudice rule). In Brakeman, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held “that where an insurance
company seeks to be relieved of its obligations under a liability insurance policy on the ground of late
notice, the insurance company will be required to prove that the notice provision was in fact breached
and that the breach resulted in prejudice to its position.” Id. Thus, in order to disclaim liability, the
insurer must first show the breach of the notice provision and then show that the breach was actually
prejudicial.
69
See infra notes 161–226 and accompanying text.
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70

policies.
In Gulf, the law firm of Dolan, Fertig & Curtis obtained a
claims-made and reported policy from the Gulf Insurance Company.71 The
insurance policy was in effect from November 20, 1978, through
November 20, 1979, and required Gulf to pay all damages for claims
arising out of professional legal services offered by the law firm.72 The
policy required three things: first, that the claim must arise out of services
performed during the policy period; second, that the claim must be made
against the insured during the policy period; and third, that the claim must
be reported to the insurer during the policy period.73
Dolan, Fertig & Curtis decided to obtain new claims-made coverage
from another carrier, and that coverage was to become effective on
November 20, 1979.74 While the new policy contained a retroactive
provision that dated back to 1977, it expressly disclaimed liability for
“claims arising out of any occurrence prior to the effective date of the
policy if the insured knew of it prior to the policy period.”75 On November
19, 1979, the last day of the Gulf policy, the law firm received a letter from
a client indicating that the client no longer desired representation from
Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, that the firm was grossly negligent in performing
its legal services, and that the firm should put its malpractice insurance
carrier on notice of the allegations.76
On or about December 6, 1979, Dolan, Fertig & Curtis notified its new
insurance carrier of the claim.77 However, the new carrier disclaimed
liability since the firm was aware of the claim prior to the inception of the
insurance policy on November 20, 1979.78 After its lack of success with
the new insurance carrier, Dolan, Fertig & Curtis notified Gulf of the claim
on or about February 12, 1980.79 Gulf also denied the claim, noting that
there would be no coverage since the claim was reported to Gulf outside
the policy period, and the insurance contract expressly required that notice
be provided during the policy period.80
During the time the law firm sought coverage from one of its two
carriers, the firm received a judgment against it for over $50,000.81 The
70
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 1983). As will be discussed,
the court was construing a claims-made and reported policy, and while it is a type of claims-made
policy, this holding does not expressly include pure claims-made policies. This Note argues that such a
holding does implicitly include pure claims-made policies.
71
Id. at 513.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 513–14.
79
Id. at 514.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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firm then initiated suit seeking a declaratory judgment that either Gulf or
the new carrier was liable for the damages award against it.82 Initially,
both insurance companies’ motions for summary judgment were granted;
however, Dolan, Fertig & Curtis appealed the granting of Gulf’s motion
for summary judgment.83 The appellate court reversed summary judgment,
as it held that the contract was not ambiguous and that claims-made
policies were not against public policy.84 However, the court held that in
order to make the insurance policy “fair,” there should be a reasonable
time after the expiration of a policy for an insured to report claims that are
discovered late in the policy period, notwithstanding the fact that such
reporting would extend beyond the policy period.85 On the petition for
rehearing, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court
of Florida: “As a matter of policy may the court require that ‘claims made’
professional liability policies should [sic] be subjected to a reasonable
additional period beyond the termination date of the policy for reporting
claims that arise late in the contract term?”86
The court answered the preceding question in the negative, and began
its discussion by referring to the distinction between claims-made and
occurrence policies.87 Prior to this case, the general rule in Florida was
that when an insured provides late notice of a claim in the occurrence
context, a presumption of prejudice was created against the insured.88
However, although prejudice is presumed, “recovery is not precluded if the
insured can demonstrate lack of actual prejudice.”89 Therefore, the insurer
has no burden to show that it was prejudiced by the insured’s delay in
giving notice pursuant to the policy; rather, “the burden rests upon the one
seeking to impose liability to show that no prejudice did, in fact, occur.”90
The court differentiated claims-made policies from occurrence
policies, noting that the event that triggers coverage is different. In claimsmade policies, the trigger is when a claim is made against an insured and
the insurer is notified of such a claim; in occurrence policies, the trigger is
when an injurious act occurs.91 The court then emphasized that claims82

Id.
Dolan, Fertig & Curtis v. Gulf Ins. Co., 419 So. 2d 1108, 1111 (Fla. 1982), rev’d, 433 So. 2d
512, 516 (Fla. 1983).
84
Gulf, 433 So. 2d at 514.
85
Id. (quoting Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 419 So. 2d at 1110).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
National Gypsum Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1982).
89
Id.
90
Deese v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 205 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. App. 1967) (noting that
“no burden rests on the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the insured's delay in giving the notice
as required by the terms of the policy”).
91
Gulf, 433 So. 2d at 514 (“An occurrence policy is a policy in which the coverage is effective if
the negligent act or omission occurs within the policy period, regardless of the date of discovery or the
date the claim is made or asserted . . . . A claims made policy is a policy wherein the coverage is
83

254

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:235

made policies are designed in part to limit the tail exposure of a liability
policy, a problem that plagued occurrence policy providers and led, in part,
to the introduction of claims-made policies.92 The court noted that
“[n]otice within an occurrence policy is not the critical and distinguishing
feature of that policy type,” and that such policies are “built around an
insurer who is liable for the insured’s malpractice, no matter when
discovered, so long as the malpractice occurred within the time confines of
the policy period.” 93 As such, the “occurrence insurer . . . is faced with a
‘tail’ that extends beyond the policy period itself.”94 The “‘tail’ is the lapse
of time between the date of the error (within the policy period) and the
time when a claim is made against the insured.”95 The court then noted
that because claims-made policies require that the notice be given as soon
as practicable as well as within the policy period, there is significantly less
tail exposure than that of an occurrence policy.96 For that reason, requiring
an insurer to allow extra reporting time after the end of the policy period
“negates the inherent difference between the two contract types,” and “[i]f
a court were to allow an extension of reporting time after the end of the
policy period, such is tantamount to an extension of coverage to the insured
gratis, something for which the insurer has not bargained.”97 To permit
this extension of coverage would “in effect rewrite[] the contract between
the two parties,” something that the court “cannot and will not do.”98
While the Gulf court did not expressly provide that the noticeprejudice rule does not apply to claims-made and reported policies when
notice is given outside the policy period, the effect of the decision reflects
that position. Because the court held that an insurer need not provide an
“extension of reporting time” after the expiration of a claims-made and
reported policy, regardless of whether late notice injured the insurer or not,
the court, in so many words, rejected application of the notice-prejudice
rule in claims-made (and reported) policies.99 Indeed, other Florida courts
have agreed that Gulf stands for the proposition that an insurer need not
effective if the negligent or omitted act is discovered and brought to the attention of the insurer within
the policy term.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court quickly dispensed with the law firm’s
argument that claims-made policies were in violation of public policy—the court found that such
policies were not “patently offensive,” “inimical to the public welfare,” or encouraging conduct that is
“deleterious, anti-social or unlawful.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Id. Of course, an insured who previously obtained an occurrence policy would still have
coverage for claims arising out of occurrences during those policy years. See supra notes 28–44 and
accompanying text (describing the development of the claims-made policy).
93
Gulf, 433 So. 2d at 515.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (“Coverage depends on the claim being made and reported to the insurer during the policy
period. . . . If the claim is reported to the insurer during the policy period, then the carrier is legally
obligated to pay; if the claim is not reported ruing the policy period, no liability attaches.”).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 515–16.
99
Id. at 515.
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show prejudice in order to disclaim liability after notice is given outside
the policy period in claims-made and reported policies.
In Pantropic Power Products, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., a
Florida court noted that “the [Florida] supreme court has rejected
applicability of the rule to claims-made policies,” referring to the decision
in Gulf.100 Likewise, a Florida court in The Doctors Co. v. Health
Management Associates provided that:
[A] prejudice analysis is not reached under [a claims-made
and reported policy]. We are guided in our holding by
Gulf . . . which denied claims-made coverage for a claim
alleged to have occurred during the policy period but not
reported to the insurer until after the policy expired. . . . Thus,
prejudice is not a factor here that can extend coverage that has
expired.101
While the majority of the fifty states have held that the noticeprejudice rule applies to late notice in occurrence policies, no state has
expressly held that the notice-prejudice rule should apply to claims-made
and reported policies when notice is given outside the policy period.102
Some states have not decided whether the rule should apply, while others
have expressly held that an insurer need not show prejudice in order to
deny coverage based on late notice under claims-made and reported
policies.103
B. Notice-Prejudice Rule in Pure Claims-Made Policies
Only four states—California,104 Texas,105 Pennsylvania,106 and
100
Pantropic Power Prods., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1369 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
101
The Doctors Co. v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 943 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
102
Covington & Burling, Application of Notice-Prejudice Rule (“N-P”) by State (2008),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/prog_materials/2008_sectionannual/010.pdf. This analysis does not
consider the jurisdictions in which failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage is a bar to
recovery under the policy.
103
Id.
104
See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Rausch, 221 Cal. App. 3d. 1348, 1358–59 (1990) (holding
that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to claims-made and reported policies); Pension Trust Fund
for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co, 307 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (agreeing that the noticeprejudice rule applies to pure claims-made policies but not claims-made and reported policies).
105
See East Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:04-CV-165, 2007 WL 2048660, at *9
(E.D. Tex. July 12, 2007) (mem.) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claimsmade policies); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co, No. Civ.A. 3-96-CV-3179R, 1998 WL
51363, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1998) (mem.) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to
pure claims-made policies).
106
See Coregis Ins. Co. v. Caruso, No. 06-2189, 2006 WL 3762026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19,
2006) (mem.) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies); 4th
Street Investors v. Dowdell, No. 06-0536, 2008 WL 163052, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2008) (mem.)
(holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies).
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107

Massachusetts —have truly addressed the question of whether the noticeprejudice rule should apply to pure claims-made policies.108 While courts
applying Texas, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts law have held that the
notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies,109
California courts (and federal courts applying California law) have held
that the notice-prejudice rule applies to pure claims-made policies but not
claims-made and reported policies.110
1. California
In 1970, a California court was first presented with the question of
whether the notice-prejudice rule applied to claims-made policies.111 In
Northwestern Title v. Flack, a California court of appeals for the first
district decided that the notice-prejudice rule applied to claims-made
policies, though the court failed to distinguish the type of claims-made
policy that was at issue in the case.112 In 1964, Albert and Melanie Arens
decided to purchase a parcel of land in order to subdivide the property.113
The couple employed Northwestern Title to draft a title report that would
reflect easements and limitations on the property.114 Northwestern
completed its title search, though it failed to discover that there were
limitations on the land that restricted development to only one dwelling.115
After realizing its error, Northwestern attempted to purchase additional
easements to remedy the issue, though it proved unsuccessful.116 In
107
See Tenovsky v. Alliance Syndicate, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Mass. 1997) (holding that
the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies).
108
Other states may have addressed late notice in the pure claims-made context, though it is
difficult to ascertain whether the policies at issue are, in fact, pure claims-made policies. Courts tend to
omit portions of the insuring agreement at issue, leaving the reader without a complete view of the
policy contemplated by the court. For instance, a federal court applying Louisiana law held that the
notice-prejudice rule does not apply to claims-made policy that could, based on the quoted language, be
a pure claims-made policy. See Williams v. Synergy Care, Inc., No. 07–0137, 2008 WL 2945918, at
*4 (W.D. La. Jul. 29, 2008) (unreported) (providing that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to
claims-made policies). In Williams, the court did not specifically call the policy a “pure claims-made”
policy, though the notice provision in the policy provided that “[a]s a condition precedent to any right
to payment in respect of any Claim . . . the Insureds must give the underwriter [sic] written notice of
such Claim, with full details, as soon as practicable after it is first made.” Id. at *2. The opinion did
not reference any more of the policy language; as such, a reader would have a good faith basis for
taking the position that in Louisiana, the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made
policies. However, one could not be completely certain that other courts would follow that reasoning,
as it is not completely clear that the Williams court actually construed a pure claims-made policy.
109
See infra notes 161–225 and accompanying text.
110
See Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule applies to pure claims-made but not claims-made and
reported policies).
111
Nw. Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 140 (1970).
112
Id. at 144.
113
Id. at 139.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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August of 1965, the Arenses instituted an action against Northwestern for
damages incurred as a result of the defective title report.117
Northwestern notified its professional liability carrier—Underwriters
at Lloyds, London—of its error, though Lloyds denied the claim due to
Northwestern’s late notice of the claim.118 After Lloyds denied the claim,
Northwestern settled the dispute for $5500, and sought reimbursement
from Lloyds.119
The trial court determined that Lloyds was not
substantially prejudiced by the delay, and a judgment was entered against
the insurer for $8,613.55—the sum of the settlement, attorneys fees, cost,
and interest.120 Lloyds appealed the judgment, arguing in part that the
court should strictly enforce conditions precedent to coverage and reject
the application of the notice-prejudice rule to claims-made policies.121
Before making its decision, the court turned to Campbell v. Allstate
Insurance Co., an earlier California decision in which the notice-prejudice
rule was applied to late notice in the occurrence policy context.122 In that
case, the California Supreme Court considered late notice in an automobile
policy and broadly held that “prejudice must be shown with respect to
breach of a notice clause.”123 The Flack court concluded that because
Campbell did not expressly exclude claims-made policies from its holding,
the notice-prejudice rule applied to both claims-made policies as well as
occurrence policies.124 The court noted that with late notice in either
occurrence policies or claims-made policies, “the crucial question in each
instance is not the possibility of prejudice but rather whether there was
117

Id.
Id.
119
Id. at 140.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 143. The court noted that:
[The defendant] argues that the cases which hold that an insurer may assert defenses
based upon a breach by the insured of a policy condition only where the insurer was
substantially prejudiced thereby, have been enunciated in ‘occurrence-type’ policies
where the obligation of the insurer is fixed in time by reference to the happening of
an occurrence occasioning loss, such as an automobile accident. In the ‘occurrencetype’ cases, . . . the damages are fixed once the event has happened. Thus, since
there is little danger of an expansion of the liability, the need for prompt notification
is reduced. Defendant contends that irrespective of the date of the insured’s tort and
the date of loss in a ‘claims-type’ policy insuring against claims for errors and
omissions, the obligation of the insurer dates in point of time from the time when the
third party claim is made against the insured. Accordingly, defendant argues that in
a ‘claims-type’ policy the possibility of prejudice resulting from late notice is greater
than in ‘occurrence-type’ policies.
118

Id.

122

Id. at 143–44 (referring to Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 155 (Cal. 1963)).
Campbell, 384 P.2d at 156.
124
Nw. Title Sec. Co., 6 Cal App. 3d at 143–44. The court broadly concluded that
“notwithstanding the generic differences between [claims-made and occurrence] policies, there is no
indication in Campbell . . . that a different rule can apply in ‘claims-type’ policies. The cases make it
clear that the subject rule applies to all cases in which the insurer asserts a defense based upon a breach
by the insured of a cooperation or notice clause.” Id.
123
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actual prejudice to the insurer.”
It was not until 1990 that a California court reconsidered the rather
austere holding of Flack.126 In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Rausch,
a California court of appeals for the second district determined that the
notice-prejudice rule did not apply to claims-made and reported policies.127
Pacific Employers Insurance issued Rausch, an insurance salesman, a
claims-made and reported liability policy in effect from March 15, 1981,
through March 15, 1983.128 On November 2, 1982, Rausch died.129
Rausch’s widow tendered the policy to the law firm handling her
husband’s estate, though the law firm failed to notify Pacific Employers of
claims that were made soon after.130 When notice was eventually provided
to Pacific Employers, the company denied coverage because notice was
not provided during the policy period as required by the claims-made and
reported policy.131
Rausch brought suit, and the trial court held that Pacific Employers
would need to show actual prejudice in order to deny the claim.132 Pacific
Employers appealed, and Rausch first maintained that the notice-prejudice
rule is applicable to claims-made and reported policies, and that because
Pacific Employers could not show prejudice, the insurer should be liable
for the claim.133 The Pacific Employers court declined to follow Flack in
its application of the notice-prejudice rule to both claims-made and
occurrence policies, noting that:
We recognize that the “notice prejudice” rule has been
applied to a “claims made” professional errors and omissions
policy . . . . In applying the rule, however, the Flack court
relied solely on Campbell finding, without discussion, that
the distinction between a “claims made” insurance policy and
an “occurrence” policy did not require a departure from the
ordinary application of the notice-prejudice rule. In our
opinion, this distinction is critical.134
The Pacific Employers court engaged in an analysis that contrasted claimsmade policies and occurrence policies.135 In a discussion that closely
resembled that of the Florida Supreme Court in Gulf—the Pacific
125

Id. at 144.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Rausch, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1348 (1990).
127
Id. at 1359.
128
Id. at 1352–53.
129
Id. at 1353.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1353–54.
133
Id. at 1354.
134
Id. at 1357.
135
Id. at 1358.
126
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Employers court noted that while notice provisions in occurrence policies
were designed to aid the insurer in investigating and defending claims,
notice provisions in claims-made policies were designed to curtail the
“unpredictable and lengthy ‘tail’ of lawsuits filed years after the
occurrence.”136 Because occurrence policies created lengthy and expensive
“tails,” the court reasoned that claims-made policies—and their notice
provisions—were materially different from occurrence policies.137 As
such, the California court held that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply
to claims-made and reported policies.138
The Pacific Employers decision created a split in California courts;
while Flack stood for the proposition that the notice-prejudice rule applied
to both occurrence and claims-made policies,139 Pacific Employers stood
for the proposition that the rule applies to occurrence policies but not
claims-made and reported policies.140 Because the decisions were from
appellate courts in different districts, neither decision could control the
other.141
One year later, a federal court applying California law was asked to
determine whether the notice-prejudice rule should apply to claims-made
and reported policies.142 In Burns v. International Insurance Co., the court
considered a claims-made and reported policy requiring that claims be
made within the policy period and reported to the insurer within the policy
period or sixty days thereafter.143 The insureds—officers and directors of a
bank—were sued following allegations of professional misconduct and did
not notify International Insurance until five months after the expiration of
the policy period.144 The policy holders sued after coverage was denied,
and International Insurance was granted summary judgment at the trial
court level.145 The insureds appealed, claiming that the notice-prejudice
rule applies to claims-made policies in California.146
The Burns court noted that because the California Supreme Court had
not decided whether the notice-prejudice rule applied to claims-made
136

Id.
Id.
138
Id. at 1358–59.
139
See Nw. Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal App. 3d 134, 144 (1970) (holding that the noticeprejudice rule applies to both occurrence and claims-made insurance policies).
140
See Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1358–59 (holding that the notice-prejudice
rule does not apply to claims-made and reported policies).
141
See Burns v. Int’l Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “[b]ecause [the
Flack and Pacific Employers] decisions are from different districts of the Court of Appeal, neither is
binding on the other”).
142
Id. at 1423.
143
Id. at 1424.
144
Id. at 1423. Because the insureds had sixty additional days after the policy expiration to report
the claim, notice of their claim was over three months late. Id.
145
Id. at 1423–24.
146
Id. at 1424.
137
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insurance policies, it would look to other authority in determining how that
court would resolve the question.147 The court found the Pacific
Employers decision convincing, first noting that because the California
Supreme Court denied a request to review the case, “the denial provides
some indication that Pacific Employers was decided correctly.”148 Further,
the Burns court agreed that the distinction between claims-made policies
and occurrence policies “is critical,” and that “[t]o apply the notice
prejudice rule to a claims-made policy would be to rewrite the policy,
extending the policy’s coverage at no cost to the insured.”149
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, determined that
while the notice-prejudice rule did not apply to claims-made and reported
policies, it did apply to pure claims-made policies.150 The case was
relatively complicated; the insured—Pension Trust Fund—was named in a
third-party action after it engaged in a series of unsuccessful
investments.151 Pension Trust tendered its claim to Federal Insurance
Company with whom it had a fiduciary responsibility insurance policy.152
However, Pension Trust failed to provide timely notice of one of its claims
to the insurer.153 Federal denied coverage based on this late notice, and
Pension Trust argued that Federal would need to show prejudice in order to
properly deny the claim.154
The policy at issue was a pure claims-made policy with a notice
provision that provided that “The insured shall, as a condition precedent to
its right to be indemnified under this policy, give the Company notice as
soon as practicable in writing of any claim made against it.”155 The court
identified the existence of pure claims-made policies as distinct from
claims-made and reported policy, noting that “[c]laims-made policies can
be further classified as either claims-made-and-reported policies, which
require that claims be reported within the policy period, or general claimsmade policies, which contain no such reporting requirement.”156 While the
former distinction was technically accurate, the court went on to note that
“[t]he Federal policy was a claims-made policy with no reporting
requirement. The policy language required that [Pension Trust] provide
notice of claims ‘as soon as practicable.’ It did not require that the claims
be reported within the policy period or even within a specific number of
147

Id.
Id. at 1425.
149
Id.
150
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir.
2002).
151
Id. at 947–48.
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Id. at 947.
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Id. at 955.
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Id. at 955–56.
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Id. at 956 n.6.
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Id. at 955.
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157

days thereafter.”
By convincing itself that the pure claims-made policy
at issue contained no reporting requirement, the court held that:
It is reasonable to conclude that a claims-made-andreported policy differs from a general claims-made policy
containing no requirement that the claim be reported within
the policy period. . . . [T]he reporting requirement serves two
different purposes in the two policies. The notice provision
in a general claims made policy, as in an occurrence policy,
often requires notice ‘as soon as practicable.’ This serves to
‘facilitate the timely investigation of claims by bringing an
event to the attention of the insurer and allows an inquiry
‘before the scent of factual investigation grows cold.’ In
contrast, in a claims-made-and-reported policy, notice is the
event that actually triggers coverage. Because [the insured’s]
policy did not contain a reporting requirement, the notice
prejudice rule applies.158
Once the court determined that Federal needed to show prejudice, it
remanded for further proceedings to determine if such prejudice could be
shown.159
By conflating the notice provisions in occurrence and pure claimsmade policies, the Pension Trust court managed to persuade itself that pure
claims-made policies were akin to occurrence policies merely due to the
fact that both require notice “as soon as practicable.” Perhaps because the
phrasing of the notice provisions in both types of policies was identical, the
court concluded that the rational for requiring notice “as soon as
practicable” in pure claims-made policies is to provide the insurer with
ample time to investigate the claim. While ensuring that a policy holder
provides adequate time for an insurer to investigate claims is one reason
that notice is required “as soon as practicable,” pure claims-made policies
are less expensive than occurrence policies for the same reason claimsmade and reported policies are less expensive; the policies are designed to
curb the problem of long “tail coverage,” reduce insurer liability, and
consequently reduce the cost of premiums. While the Pension Trust court
was correct to identify that two types of claims-made policies exist—pure
claims-made and claims-made and reported—the court unfortunately
undermined one of the central reasons for the creation of pure claims-made
policies.160
157

Id. at 956.
Id. at 956–57 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 957.
160
Of course, the Pension Trust holding is favorable to the insured and/or the injured party.
While the court’s holding does not focus exclusively on a public policy rationale for assuring coverage,
158
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2. Pennsylvania
Before the 2006 decision in Coregis Insurance Co. v. Caruso,161 the
law regarding late notice and the notice-prejudice rule in Pennsylvania was
very similar to that of Florida.162 In City of Harrisburg v. International
Surplus Lines Insurance Co., a federal court applying Pennsylvania law
concluded that the notice-prejudice rule should not apply to claims-made
(and reported) policies.163 Like Gulf, the City of Harrisburg court found
the differences between occurrence policies and claims-made and reported
policies persuasive in determining that the notice-prejudice rule should not
apply to claims-made and reported policies.164 The court provided three
policy reasons for not extending the notice-prejudice rule to claims-made
policies. First, the court noted that while those purchasing occurrence
policies are generally unable to bargain over the notice provision, those
purchasing claims-made policies could bargain for an extended discovery
period.165 Second, the court suggested that to apply the notice-prejudice
rule to claims-made policies would effectively provide the insured with
free coverage.166 Finally, the court concluded that “[i]n a claims-made
policy, the provision requiring notice before the end of the policy period
serves a different purpose” than that in an occurrence policy.167 Notably,
the notice provision in claims-made policies “provides a certain date after
which an insurer knows that it no longer is liable under the policy, and
accordingly, allows the insurer to more accurately fix its reserves for future
liabilities and compute premiums with greater certainty.”168
In Coregis Insurance Co. v. Caruso, a federal court applying
Pennsylvania law held that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply to
claims-made policies requiring notice “as soon as practicable.”169 While
one may argue that this holding is desirable given that the party who might be hurt in the third-party
insurance context tends to be the injured party rather than the insured.
161
Coregis Ins. Co. v. Caruso, No. 06-2189, 2006 WL 3762026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2006)
(mem.).
162
During this time, Pennsylvania courts held that the notice-prejudice rule applied to late notice
in occurrence policies, but not in claims-made and reported policies, which was the law in Florida
following the decision in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla.
1983).
163
City of Harrisburg v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 954, 961 (M.D. Pa. 1984)
(mem.). This court’s opinion, like many other opinions referring to the notice-prejudice rule, merely
called the policy at issue a “claims-made” policy. Id. However, the court was construing a claimsmade and reported policy. Id. The failure of courts to specify which type of claims-made policy is at
hand in a particular case may have led to some of the confusion in articulating whether the noticeprejudice rule should apply to pure claims-made policies.
164
City of Harrisburg, 596 F. Supp. at 961.
165
Id. at 962.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Coregis Ins. Co. v. Caruso, No. 06-2189, 2006 WL 3762026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2006)
(mem.).
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the Coregis court did not specifically indicate that it was construing a pure
claims-made policy, the notice provision provided by the court is that of
pure claims-made policies.170 In the case, the insured was an attorney who
handled disability claims.171 After failing to properly file the defendant’s
disability claim, the defendant brought suit against the attorney.172 While
suit was filed and the attorney was served, Coregis Insurance was not
notified of the claim until four years after the claim was made, and it
subsequently denied coverage upon notification.173 The attorney’s former
client brought suit against Coregis seeking payment for the default
judgment that was subsequently entered against the attorney.174 Without
any significant analysis, the court declared that because “the noticeprejudice rule does not apply to claims-made policies,” coverage was
properly declined.175 Because the court did not provide the rationale
behind its holding, the holding may arguably be due to the court’s failure
to distinguish between pure claims-made and claims-made and reported
policies. However, the court may very well have identified the similarities
between pure claims-made and claims-made and reported policies and
decided that the same rationale for not applying the notice-prejudice rule to
claims-made and reported policies extends to pure claims-made policies.176
The plaintiffs in 4th Street Investors v. Dowdell sued for garnishment
under a Directors and Officers liability policy after the insured allegedly
misrepresented the health of his company.177 When the claim was initially
brought, Dowdell, the insured, failed to notify Federal Insurance of the
claim.178 During the subsequent garnishment proceedings, Federal claimed
that Dowdell’s lack of notice precluded coverage under the policy.179 In
response, the plaintiffs argued that first, the policy was pure claims-made;
second, that pure claims-made policies have no reporting requirement; and
third, that the insurer should have to show prejudice to disclaim liability
due to lack of notice in such policies.180
While only portions of the Federal insurance policy are quoted in the
case, the language suggests that it is a pure claims-made policy. The
reporting requirement provides that “[a]ny insured shall, as a condition
precedent to exercising their rights under any Liability Coverage Section,
170

Id.
Id.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
4th Street Investors v. Dowdell, No. 06-0536, 2008 WL 163052, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15,
2008) (mem.).
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Id.
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Id. at *3.
180
Id. at *7.
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give to the Company written notice as soon as practicable of any Claim.”181
The plaintiffs insisted that this language was indicative of a pure claimsmade policy and that the “rejection of the notice prejudice rule h[as]
developed in cases that, in reality, involved claims-made-and-reported
policies—not those written on a pure claims-made basis.”182 Further, the
plaintiffs argued that the language in the declarations page of the policy
suggests that the policy contains no reporting requirement.183 However,
the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, and it instead read the
declarations in conjunction with the rest of the policy.184 The court noted
that “ignoring [the policy’s] reporting requirements does greater damage to
fundamental contract principles than reading them as integral to the
contract as a whole.”185 In dismissing the plaintiffs’ argument, the court
characterized the pure claims-made policy as a claims-made and reported
policy based on the reporting requirement that the insurer be notified “as
soon as practicable.”186
The court went on to hold that Federal need not show prejudice to
disclaim liability due to the insured’s lack of notice.187 By following the
court’s logic, the holding appears to apply to late notice in a pure claimsmade context. First, the court initially provided that “lack of notice or late
notice under a claims-made policy precludes coverage.”188 Then, the court
noted that “[t]his rule, however, does not precisely cover the situation
presented by . . . Federal’s Motion for Summary Judgment” since the
plaintiff argued that in a pure claims-made context, the notice-prejudice
rule should apply.189 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument partly
due to its “reporting requirement” in the policy (that claims be reported “as
soon as practicable”).190 While the court categorized the pure claims-made
policy as a type of a claims-made and reported policy, this categorization
was merely due to the fact that the policy had a reporting requirement—the
insurer was to be notified as soon as practicable.
Like the other courts declining to extend the notice-prejudice rule to
claims-made policies, the 4th Street Investors court indicated that the rule
should not apply since “[t]he risk to an insurer writing a claims-made
policy is narrowly circumscribed.”191 Further, the court noted that:
181

Id. at *6.
Id.
183
Id. at *6–7. The declarations provide: “The liability coverage sections (whichever are
purchased) [sic] provide claims made coverage which applies only to ‘claims’ first made during the
‘policy period’ or to any extended reporting period.” Id. at *7.
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Id. at *6, *8.
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Coverage [in the claims-made context] is triggered by notice
from the insured and ends at a point at which the insurer
knows that it will have no further liability under the policy.
This benefits the insurer who is able more precisely to
calculate risk, and the insured, who pays a significantly lower
premium than is available under an occurrence-based
policy.192
Unlike the court in Pension Trust,193 the 4th Street Investors court aptly
concluded that the risk-calculating considerations applicable to claimsmade and reported policies are just as applicable to pure claims-made
policies. While the issue in 4th Street Investors involved lack of notice,
the case is applicable to late-notice situations. Specifically, the court held
that when a claims-made policy requires reporting “as soon as practicable,”
an insurer need not show prejudice to disclaim coverage when notice was
not as soon as practicable.194
3. Massachusetts
Similar to the court in 4th Street Investors, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to
pure claims-made policies.195 In Tenovsky v. Alliance Syndicate, Inc., the
plaintiff and his wife brought a tort action against the plaintiff’s employer
for personal injury and loss of consortium.196 The Tenovskys sought a
declaratory judgment that Alliance, the employer’s insurer, must defend
the employer in the tort action and pay any judgment up to the policy
limit.197 The court noted that the Alliance policy included a clause
providing that “in the event that a claim is made against the insured, the
insured must ensure that the insurer receives ‘prompt written notice’ of the
claim.”198 Although Tenovsky’s employer was aware of the claim, the
employer failed to notify Alliance of the suit.199 Alliance was unaware of
the claim until it received copies of the Tenovskys’ complaint and
summons two and one half years after the suit was filed.200 Based on the
insured’s failure to provide notice of the claim, Alliance denied
coverage.201
192
193

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir.

2002).

194

4th Street Investors, 2008 WL 163052, at *6, *10.
See Tenovsky v. Alliance Syndicate, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Mass. 1997) (holding that
the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies).
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Id. at 1145.
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In holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure claimsmade policies, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on the
same policy rationale for not applying the notice-prejudice rule to claimsmade and reported policies. Specifically, the court noted that the
requirement that notice of a claim must be made during the policy period
or soon thereafter provides fairness in rate setting.202 Likewise, the court
provided that:
The closer in time that the insured event and the insurer’s
payoff are, the more predictable the amount of the payment
will be, and the more likely it is that rates will fairly reflect
the risks taken by the insurer . . . . If a claim is made against
an insured, but the insurer does not know about it until years
later, the primary purpose of insuring claims rather than
occurrences is frustrated.203
While the Tenovsky case may be distinguished on the facts (notice was
not merely late, but it was absent), the court’s basis for refusing to apply
the notice-prejudice rule to pure claims-made policies is still applicable.
Because pure claims-made policies were designed to provide cheaper
coverage and more accurate rates, application of the notice-prejudice rule
would extend coverage and subvert the rationale behind claims-made
policies.
4. Texas
Texas has taken a narrow—and for the purposes of this Note—
appropriate position with regard to the applicability of the notice-prejudice
rule in pure claims-made policies. Unfortunately, like the courts in
Pennsylvania, two of the noteworthy Texas opinions are memorandum
opinions.204 That in itself is interesting, and perhaps suggests that Texas
courts find such little merit in the distinctions that are often drawn between
pure claims-made and claims-made and reported policies that the courts
found their conclusions bitingly obvious, neglecting to publish their
opinions and establish precedent. Nevertheless, consideration of these
Texas opinions is important, particularly so that courts in other
jurisdictions may follow Texas’s lead.
In Chicago Insurance Co. v. Western World Insurance Co., a federal
court applying Texas law held that the notice-prejudice rule should apply
202

Id. at 1146.
Id. (quoting Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Mass. 1990)).
204
See Chicago Ins. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co, No. Civ.A. 3-96-CV-3179R, 1998 WL 51363, at
*2–3 (N. D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1998) (mem.) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to pure
claims-made policies); East Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:04-CV-165, 2007 WL
2048660, at *7 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2007) (mem.) (holding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply
to pure claims-made policies).
203
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to neither claims-made and reported policies nor pure claims-made
policies.205 The case was relatively complicated, as it involved a
disagreement between two separate insurance companies providing two
different insurance policies.206 Chicago Insurance Company provided the
insured with an occurrence policy, and Western World Insurance Company
provided a pure claims-made policy.207 A claim was brought against the
insured, and while both insurers disclaimed liability, they settled the case
on behalf of the insured and agreed to litigate between themselves.208
Chicago Insurance took the position that Western World was responsible
for the claim since it contended that an insurer must show prejudice to
deny a claim following late notice in the pure claims-made context.209
Chicago Insurance argued that the difference between a pure claims-made
and a claims-made and reported policy is that a pure claims-made policy
has no reporting requirement, thereby making it subject to the noticeprejudice rule.210 The court swiftly rejected the argument, noting that it
was a “bizarre” interpretation of the phrase “as soon as practicable” and
that such language was an “explicit” reporting requirement.211 Next,
Chicago Insurance argued that Western World should be required to show
prejudice to disclaim liability since the policy was pure claims-made rather
than a claims-made and reported policy.212 The court noted that Chicago
Insurance provided no authority to support its argument, and concluded
that the court would not apply the notice-prejudice rule to pure claimsmade policies.213
In East Texas Medical Center v. Lexington Insurance Co., another
federal court applying Texas law expanded on the court’s holding in
Chicago Insurance and held that “[c]onsistent with Texas and Fifth Circuit
law governing claims-made policies, the court declines to impose a duty on
[the Insurer] to show prejudice for untimely notice” in the pure claimsmade context.214 In East Texas Medical Center, the court considered a
pure claims-made medical malpractice liability policy requiring notice “as
soon as practicable.”215 Lexington denied coverage on the claim due to
late notice after the insured failed to provide notice of a claim for seven
months, which also happened to be seven months after the expiration of the
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policy period. The insured claimed that Lexington should be required to
show prejudice to deny coverage, arguing that a pure claims-made policy:
[R]equires only that a claim be made during the policy
period, and leaves open the possibility that notice may be
sent after the expiration of the policy period. . . . [T]herefore,
. . . the notice provision in the Lexington policy is not an
element of the covered risk and should not be treated as
such.217
The court summarily dismissed the insured’s argument, noting that
“[a] review of Texas and Fifth Circuit cases applying Texas law . . . reveals
no indication that Texas courts have recognized or are likely to recognize
[the Insured’s] suggested distinction.”218 The court noted that rejecting the
notice-prejudice rule in the claims-made context is in “congruence with”
the rationale for applying the rule to claims-made and reported policies.219
Further, the court held that “[t]o require coverage under a claims-made
policy where the insurer is not notified of a lawsuit until over seven
months after the policy expires would unquestionably expand the risks
covered and undermine or destroy the benefits of the claims-made
coverage.”220 While this court—like many courts before it—failed to
specifically call the policy at issue a pure claims-made policy, it noted that
a “distinction” exists between the types of claims-made policies, yet
nevertheless aptly held that the notice-prejudice rule applies to neither.221
On March 27, 2009, the Texas Supreme Court endorsed the current noprejudice trend for late notice in pure claims-made policies. The Fifth
Circuit recently certified the question of whether “an insurer [must] show
prejudice to deny payment on a claims-made policy, when the denial is
based upon the insured’s breach of the policy’s prompt-notice provision,
but the notice is nevertheless given within the policy’s coverage period.”222
Although the Texas Supreme Court answered this question in the
affirmative,223 the rationale makes sense. The court reasoned that an
insurer should be required to prove prejudice when notice was not
provided as soon as practicable within the policy period since the insurer
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had not yet “closed its books” on the policy.
The Texas Supreme Court
further noted that “for the insurer, the inherent benefit of a claims-made
policy is the insurer’s ability to close its books on a policy at its expiration
and thus to attain a level of predictability unattainable under standard
occurrence policies.”225 Given this language, it appears to be well-settled
law in Texas that when an insured provides notice of a claim that is not as
soon as practicable and outside the pure claims-made policy period, an
insurer will be allowed to disclaim coverage without showing prejudice.
C. Going Forward: Handling the Notice-Prejudice Rule and Pure ClaimsMade Policies in the Future
Texas, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have appropriately concluded
that the notice-prejudice rule should not apply to pure claims-made
policies. Unlike California,226 future courts addressing late notice in the
pure claims-made context should follow the current trend and similarly
reject the application of the notice-prejudice rule to any type of claimsmade policy—be it pure claims-made or claims-made and reported.227
While the requirement that notice be given “as soon as practicable” does
help the insurer adequately investigate claims (as it does in an occurrence
policy), the provision also does much more. Such notice requirements help
reduce the insurer’s long tail exposure while simultaneously providing the
insured with claims-made coverage that is far more affordable than
occurrence coverage.228 In order to provide such affordable coverage, it is
imperative that the insurer know its exposure for claims soon after a policy
period ends; otherwise, the underwriters’ ability to accurately underwrite
policies diminishes.229 While the notice-prejudice rule may initially appear
insured-friendly in purporting to provide coverage only when the insurer is
not “prejudiced” by the late notice in the traditional sense (such as being
224
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denied the ability to investigate the claim, choose the defense attorney, or
participate in settlement discussions), the late notice itself is prejudicial in
that it alters the ability of the underwriter to calculate its risk relatively
soon after the end of the policy period. The costs of such underwriter
uncertainty will likely be passed on to the insured, thereby spreading the
cost of excusing insureds’ late notice across the entire group of policyholders. As such, application of the notice-prejudice rule to pure claimsmade policies harm both the insurer and insured, and the availability of
affordable insurance coverage should be preserved by rejecting the noticeprejudice rule in the pure claims-made context.
Of course, any discussion of coverage issues in the third party
insurance context involves more individuals than just the insurer and the
insured—there is necessarily a third party bringing suit against an insured.
When an insurer denies coverage based on late notice, it may very well be
that the party that subsequently suffers is not a careless insured, but rather
the injured plaintiff who was never a party to the insurance contract to
begin with. To make matters worse, if the insured happens to be
judgment-proof, the injured party is wholly out of luck and will go
uncompensated for the injuries caused by the insured. One may take the
position that the law should require the insurer to pay for this loss (even if
it would otherwise not be obligated to do so following the insured’s late
notice) rather than leave the burden of loss on the injured without any hope
for compensation.
However, the ideal solution to this problem need not be the extension
of coverage in situations in which it never existed. If the notice-prejudice
rule were employed to ensure that injured third-parties receive some
compensation, a series of other concerns will arise, including the fear that
insureds will not comply with notice provisions since they will know
coverage will be afforded in such situations. Further, only plaintiffs
injured by insured defendants would benefit from this scheme. Instead, the
legislature should consider other options—perhaps a fund to which
insurers contribute—to ensure that those injured by defendants who fail to
comply with their policy provisions (or uninsured defendants, for that
matter) will not go uncompensated.
IV. CONCLUSION
The relative lack of case law involving the applicability of the noticeprejudice rule in the pure claims-made context should not motivate courts
to blindly follow the old rules imposing the notice-prejudice rule in
occurrence policies. Instead, courts should consider the recent opinions in
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Massachusetts and similarly hold that the noticeprejudice rule does not apply to pure claims-made policies. To do so will
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preserve the benefits of pure claims-made policies, allowing the savings
to be passed on to the insured. Likewise, New York courts that are called
on to interpret the recent legislation imposing a statutory notice-prejudice
rule to insurance policies should interpret the statutory exclusion to prevent
application of the notice-prejudice rule to pure claims-made policies.
While the statutory language may suggest that pure claims-made policies
are exempt from the rule, courts interpreting the statute should ensure that
such a position is taken and the benefits of pure claims-made policies are
preserved.

230
One of the benefits includes an insurer’s ability to accurately price premiums due to its
awareness of exposure soon after the end of a policy period, causing a lower cost of premium.

